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Abstract
Ensemble-based adversarial training is a principled approach
to achieve robustness against adversarial attacks. An impor-
tant technique of this approach is to control the transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples among ensemble members. We
propose in this work a simple yet effective strategy to collab-
orate among committee models of an ensemble model. This
is achieved via the secure and insecure sets defined for each
model member on a given sample, hence help us to quantify
and regularize the transferability. Consequently, our proposed
framework provides the flexibility to reduce the adversarial
transferability as well as to promote the diversity of ensem-
ble members, which are two crucial factors for better robust-
ness in our ensemble approach. We conduct extensive and
comprehensive experiments to demonstrate that our proposed
method outperforms the state-of-the-art ensemble baselines,
at the same time can detect a wide range of adversarial exam-
ples with a nearly perfect accuracy.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have experienced great success in
many disciplines (I. Goodfellow, Y. Bengio, and Courville,
2016), such as computer vision (K. He et al., 2016), natu-
ral language processing and speech processing (Vaswani et
al., 2017). However, even the state-of-the-art models are re-
ported to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks (Biggio et al.,
2013; I. J. Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2015; Szegedy
et al., 2014; N. Carlini and D. Wagner, 2017; Madry et al.,
2018; Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner, 2018),
which is of significant concern given the large number of
applications of deep learning in real-world scenarios. It is
thus urgent to develop deep learning models that are ro-
bust against different types of adversarial attacks. To this
end, several adversarial defense methods have been devel-
oped but typically addressing the robustness within a sin-
gle model (e.g., Papernot, P. D. McDaniel, et al., 2016;
Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard, 2016; Madry et al.,
2018; Qin et al., 2019; Shafahi et al., 2019). To cater for
more diverse types of attacks, recent work, notably (W. He et
al., 2017; Tramèr, Kurakin, et al., 2018; Strauss et al., 2017;
X. Liu et al., 2018; Pang, Xu, et al., 2019), has shown that
ensemble learning can strengthen robustness significantly.
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Despite initial success, key principles for ensemble-based
adversarial training (EAT) largely remain open. One crucial
challenge is to achieve minimum ‘transferability’ between
committee members to increase robustness for the overall
ensemble model (Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfel-
low, 2016; Yanpei Liu et al., 2016; Tramèr, Kurakin, et al.,
2018; Pang, Xu, et al., 2019; Kariyappa and Qureshi, 2019).
In (Kariyappa and Qureshi, 2019), robustness was achieved
by aligning the gradient of committee members to be dia-
metrically opposed, hence reducing the shared adversarial
spaces (Tramèr, Papernot, et al., 2017), or the transferabil-
ity. However, the method in (Kariyappa and Qureshi, 2019)
was designed for black-box attacks, thus still vulnerable to
white-box attacks. Furthermore, attempting to achieve gra-
dient alignment is unreliable for high-dimensional datasets
and it is difficult to extend for ensemble with more than
two committee members. More recently (Pang, Xu, et al.,
2019) proposed to promote the diversity of non-maximal
predictions of the committee members (i.e., the diversity
among softmax probabilities except the highest ones) to re-
duce the adversarial transferability among them. Nonethe-
less, the central concept of transferability has not been sys-
tematically addressed.
Our proposed work here will first make the concept of
adversarial transferability concrete via the definitions of se-
cure and insecure sets. To reduce the adversarial transfer-
ability and increase the model diversity, we aim to make the
insecure sets of the committee models as disjoint as pos-
sible (i.e., lessening the overlapping of those regions) and
challenge those committee members with divergent sets of
adversarial examples. In addition, we observe that lessening
the adversarial transferability alone is not sufficient to en-
sure accurate predictions of the ensemble model because the
committee member that offers inaccurate predictions might
dominate the final decisions. With this in mind, we propose
to realize what we call a “transferring flow” by collaborat-
ing robustness promoting and demoting operations. Our key
principle to coordinate the promoting and demoting opera-
tions is to promote the prediction of one model on a given
adversarial example and to demote the prediction of another
model on this example so as to maximally lessen the neg-
ative impact of the wrong predictions and ensure the cor-
rect predictions of the ensemble model. Moreover, differ-
ent from other works (Strauss et al., 2017; Pang, Xu, et al.,
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2019; Kariyappa and Qureshi, 2019) which only consider
adversarial examples of the ensemble model, the committee
members in our ensemble model are exposed to various di-
vergent adversarial example sets, which inspire them to be-
come gradually more divergent. Interestingly, by strength-
ening demoting operations, our method is capable to assist
better detection of adversarial examples. In brief, our contri-
butions in this work include:
• We propose a simple but efficient collaboration strategy
to reduce the transferability among ensemble members.
• We propose two variants of our method: the robust ori-
ented variant, which helps to improve the adversarial ro-
bustness and the detection oriented variant, which can
detect adversarial examples with high predictive perfor-
mance.
• We conduct extensive and comprehensive experiments to
demonstrate the improvement of our proposed method
over the state-of-the-art defense methods.
• We provide a further understanding of the relationship be-
tween the transferability and the overall robustness in en-
semble learning context.
Our Proposed Method
In this section, we present our ensemble collaboration strat-
egy, which allows us to collaborate many committee models
for improving the ensemble robustness. We start with the
definitions and some key properties of secure and insecure
sets which later support us in devising promoting and de-
moting operations for collaborating the committee models to
achieve the ensemble robustness. It is worth noting that our
ensemble strategy is applicable for ensembling an arbitrary
number of committee models; here we focus on presenting
the key theories, principles, and operations for the canonical
case of ensembling two models for better readability.
Secure and Insecure Sets
Consider a classification problem on a dataset D with M
classes and a pair (x,y) that represents a data example x
and its true label y which is sampled from the dataset D.
Given a model f , the crucial aim of defense is to make f ro-
bust by giving consistently accurate predictions over a ball,
B (x, ) := {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ } around a benign data exam-
ple x, for every possible x in the datasetD and the distortion
boundary . To further clarify and motivate our theory, we
define
Bsecure (x,y, f, ) := {x′ ∈ B (x, ) : argmaxifi (x′) = y} ,
Binsecure (x,y, f, ) := {x′ ∈ B (x, ) : argmaxifi (x′) 6= y} .
Intuitively, we define a secure set Bsecure (x,y, f, ) as
the set of elements in the ball B (x, ) for which the clas-
sifier f makes the correct prediction. In addition, we de-
fine the insecure set Binsecure (x,y, f, ) as the set of el-
ements in the ball B (x, ) for which f predicts differ-
ently from the true label y. By definition, the secure set
is the complement of the insecure set, and B (x, ε) =
Bsecure (x,y, f, ε)
⋃Binsecure (x,y, f, ε). It is clear that the
aim of improving adversarial robustness is to train the clas-
sifier f in such the way that Binsecure (x,y, f, ) is either as
small as possible (ideally, Binsecure (x,y, f, ) = ∅, ∀x ∈ D)
or makes an adversary hard to generate adversarial examples
in it. The following simple lemma (see the proof in the sup-
plementary material) shows the connection between those
two kinds of sets and the robustness of the ensemble model
and facilitates the development of our proposed method.
Lemma 1. Let us define fen (·) = 12f1 (·)+ 12f2 (·) for two
given models f1 and f2. If f1 and f2 predict an example x
accurately, we have the following:
i) Binsecure (x,y, fen, ) ⊂ Binsecure
(
x,y, f1, 
) ∪
Binsecure
(
x,y, f2, 
)
.
ii) Bsecure
(
x,y, f1, 
) ∩ Bsecure (x,y, f2, ) ⊂
Bsecure (x,y, fen, ) .
Dual Collaborative Ensemble
Transferring Flow. Consider the canonical case of an
ensemble consisting of two models: fen (·) = 12f1 (·) +
1
2f
2 (·), where fen is the ensemble model and {f1, f2} is
the set of ensemble committee (or the committee). Based
on the definitions of secure and insecure sets, an arbitrary
adversarial example xa must lie in one of four subsets as
shown in Table 1. Let us further clarify these subsets. In the
first subset S11 = Bsecure(x,y, f1, )
⋂Bsecure(x,y, f2, ),
the example xa is predicted correctly by both models, hence
also by the ensemble model fen (Lemma 1 (ii)). The sub-
sets S10, S01 are the intersection of a secure set of one
model and an insecure set of another model, hence an
example of two sets is predicted correctly by one model
and incorrectly by the other. Lastly, in the subset S00 =
Binsecure(x,y, f1, )
⋂Binsecure(x,y, f2, ), both models of-
fer predictions other than the true label, but there is also
no guarantee that their incorrect predictions are in the same
class. There is still a chance that the incorrect prediction in
subset S10, S01 dominates the correct ones, which leads to
the incorrect prediction on average. Therefore, the insecure
region of the overall ensemble should be related to the union
S10∪S01∪S00 or the total volume (i.e., |S10|+|S01|+|S00|)
of the subsets S10, S01, S00.
As the result, to obtain a robust ensemble model, we need
to maintain the subset S00 as small as possible, which is in
turn equivalent to making the insecure regions of the two
models as disjoint as much as possible (i.e., concurred with
Lemma 1 (i)). For the data points in either S10 or S01, we
need to increase the chance that the correct predictions dom-
inate the incorrect ones. Our approach is to encourage adver-
sarial examples inside S00 to move to the subsets S10, S01
during the course of training, and those of S10, S01 to move
to the subset S11. We term this movement as the transfer-
ring flow, which is described in Table 1. In what follows,
we present how to implement the transferring flow for our
ensemble model.
Promoting Adversarial Robustness (PO). We refer to
promoting adversarial robustness as an operation to lever-
age the information of an example xia (adversarial example
of model f i) for improving the robustness of a model f j
Table 1: Four subsets of the ensemble model and the trans-
ferring flow (arrows)
xa ∈ Bsecure(x,y, f1, ) xa ∈ Binsecure(x,y, f1, )
xa ∈ Bsecure(x,y, f2, ) S11 ⇐ S01
⇑ ⇑
xa ∈ Binsecure(x,y, f2, ) S10 ⇐ S00
(i, j can be different). There are several adversarial defense
methods that can be applied to promote adversarial robust-
ness, notably (Madry et al., 2018; Hongyang Zhang et al.,
2019; Qin et al., 2019). In this work, to promote the adver-
sarial robustness of a given adversarial example xia w.r.t the
model f j , we use adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018)
by minimizing the cross-entropy loss w.r.t the true label as
min C (f j(xia),y). After undertaking this PO, xia is ex-
pected to move to the secure set Bsecure
(
x,y, f j , 
)
. We in-
troduce two types of PO: direct PO (dPO) when i = j and
crossing PO (cPO) when i 6= j.
Demoting Adversarial Robustness (DO). In contrast to
promoting adversarial robustness, we refer to demoting ad-
versarial robustness as an operation to sacrifice the robust-
ness of a model for an example xia (adversarial example
of model f i). Here, we demote the adversarial robustness
of a given adversarial example xia w.r.t the model f
j by
max H (f j(xia)) where H is the entropy. Without any
further knowledge, the prediction is likely uniformly dis-
tributed, hence the example xia likely falls into the in-
secure set Binsecure
(
x,y, f j , 
)
instead of the secure set
Bsecure
(
x,y, f j , 
)
.
Collaboration of the Promoting and Demoting Opera-
tions. We now present how to coordinate PO/DO to en-
force the transferring flow for enhancing the adversarial ro-
bustness of the ensemble model in the canonical case of a
committee of two members {f1, f2}, parameterized by θ1
and θ2. Let x1a and x
2
a be white-box adversarial examples
of f1 and f2 respectively. With a strong adversary, we can
assume that x1a ∈ Binsecure(x,y, f1, ) (i.e., x1a ∈ S01 ∪S00)
and x2a ∈ Binsecure(x,y, f2, ) (i.e., x2a ∈ S10 ∪ S00). For
ease of comprehensibility, we present the treatment for x1a
and the same treatment is applied to x2a. To strengthen model
f1, we always use x1a to promote the robustness of model
f1 by minimizing the cross-entropy loss C (f1(x1a),y) (i.e.,
flow S01 ⇒ S11 or S00 ⇒ S10). Meanwhile, we consider
two cases of x1a w.r.t model f
2: i) being correctly predicted
by f2 (i.e., x1a ∈ S01) and ii) being incorrectly predicted by
f2 (i.e., x1a ∈ S00). For the first case, we use x1a to promote
model f2 to make sure x1a stays in the secure set of model
f2 (i.e., S11 ∪S01). For the second case, we demote x1a w.r.t
f2 by maximizing the entropy H (f2(x1a)) in order to keep
x1a in the insecure set of model f
2 (i.e., S10 ∪ S00).
Therefore, with the collaboration of two models f1 and f2
on the same example x1a, we deploy either flow S01 ⇒ S11
or S00 ⇒ S10 depending on the scenario of x1a. It is worth
noting that DO encourages f2(x1a) to be close to the uni-
form prediction, hence causing a minimal effect on the en-
semble prediction fen
(
x1a
)
. As a consequence, fen
(
x1a
)
=
Table 2: Promoting and demoting operations for the trans-
ferring flow
Scenario f1 f2
x1a ∈ S01 min C
(
f1(x1a),y
)
min C (f2(x1a),y)
x1a ∈ S00 min C
(
f1(x1a),y
)
max H (f2(x1a))
x2a ∈ S10 min C
(
f1(x2a),y
)
min C (f2(x2a),y)
x2a ∈ S00 max H
(
f1(x2a)
)
min C (f2(x2a),y)
1
2
(
f1
(
x1a
)
+ f2
(
x1a
))
is dominated by f1
(
x1a
)
, which
likely offers a correct prediction via the corresponding PO:
min C (f1(x1a),y). We summarize the PO/DO to deploy the
transferring flow in Table 2.
The objective functions for model f1 and f2 to deploy the
transferring flow are:
L(x,y, θ1) = C
(
f1(x),y
)
+ C (f1(x1a),y)
+ λpmI
(
f1(x2a),y
) C(f1(x2a),y)
− λdm
(
1− I (f1(x2a),y))H (f1(x2a)) , (1)
L(x,y, θ2) = C
(
f2(x),y
)
+ C (f2(x2a),y)
+ λpmI
(
f2(x1a),y
) C(f2(x1a),y)
− λdm
(
1− I (f2(x1a),y))H (f2(x1a)) . (2)
where λpm and λdm are the hyper-parameters for promot-
ing and demoting effects, respectively, and I
(
f1(x2a),y
)
is
the indicator to indicate whether x2a is predicted correctly
(i.e., I = 1, hence x2a ∈ S10) or incorrectly (i.e., I = 0,
hence x2a ∈ S00) by f1, which helps to switch on/off the
cPO/DO for model f1.
For the final objective function, we approximate the
hard indicator I
(
f1(x2a),y
)
by the soft version f1y(x
2
a) =
p
(
y | x2a, f1
)
, which represents the probability the model
f1 assigning x2a to the label y. We hence arrive at the fol-
lowing objective functions for both f1 and f2, respectively.
L(x,y, θ1) = C
(
f1(x),y
)
+ C (f1(x1a),y)
+ λpmf
1
y (x
2
a)C(f1(x2a),y)
− λdm
(
1− f1y (x2a)
)H (f1(x2a)) , (3)
L(x,y, θ2) = C
(
f2(x),y
)
+ C (f2(x2a),y)
+ λpmf
2
y (x
1
a)C(f2(x1a),y)
− λdm
(
1− f2y (x1a)
)H (f2(x1a)) . (4)
We note that in our implementation, the soft indicators
f1y (x
2
a) and f
2
y (x
1
a) are used as values by performing a stop-
ping gradient to prevent the back-propagation process to go
inside them for further updating f1 and f2.
Crossing Collaborative Ensemble
We now extend our collaboration strategy to enable us to
ensemble many individual members, which we term as a
Crossing Collaborative Ensemble (CCE). Specifically, given
an ensemble of N members fen (·) = 1N
∑N
n=1 f
n (·) pa-
rameterized by θn, the loss function for a model fn, n ∈
[1, N ] as follow:
Ln(x,y, θn) = C (fn(x),y) + C (fn(xna),y)
+
1
N − 1
∑
i 6=n
(
λpmf
n
y (x
i
a)C(fn(xia),y)
− λdm
(
1− fny (xia)
)
H
(
fn(xia)
))
. (5)
It appears from the above loss that we encourage each
individual model to (i) minimize the loss of the adversarial
example itself for improving its robustness (dPO) and (ii)
promoting or demoting its robustness (cPO/DO) with other
adversarial examples depending on the soft indicator.
Connections to Traditional Ensemble Learning. Firstly,
in our method, N members {fn} are reinforced with the
joint of N + 1 data sources: clean data {x} and N adver-
sarial examples {xna}Nn=1. However, depending on differ-
ent scenarios, they have the same task (PO-PO) or oppo-
site tasks (PO-DO) on the same adversarial set {xna}. Our
approach can be linked to the bagging technique in the liter-
ature, in which each classifier was trained on different sets
of data. Secondly, by assigning opposite tasks for ensemble
members, our method produces a negative correlation which
was described in (Yong Liu and Yao, 1999; Kuncheva and
Whitaker, 2003; Bagnall, Bunescu, and Stewart, 2017). It
has been claimed that negative relationship among ensemble
members can further improve the ensemble accuracy better
than the independent correlation.
Experiments
In this section, we first introduce the experimental setting for
adversarial defenses and attackers followed by an extensive
evaluation to compare our method with state-of-the-art ad-
versarial defenses. We show that our method surpasses these
methods for common benchmark datasets. Next, we provide
an ablation study to understand the transferability among en-
semble members of adversarial examples. Finally, we show
that our method not only detects adversarial examples ac-
curately and consistently but also predicts benign examples
with a significant improvement.
Experimental Setting
General Setting. We use CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 as the
benchmark datasets in our experiment.1 Both datasets have
50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. The inputs
were normalized to [0, 1]. We apply random horizontal flips
and random shifts with scale 10% for data augmentation as
used in (Pang, Xu, et al., 2019). We use both standard CNN
architecture and ResNet architecture (K. He et al., 2016)
in our experiment. The architecture and training setting for
each dataset are provided in our supplementary material.
1Recently, (Tsipras et al., 2020) found the labeling issue in the
ImageNet dataset, which highly affects the fairness of robustness
evaluation on this dataset.
Crafting Adversarial Examples for Defenders. In our
experiments, we use PGD {k, , η, l∞} as the common ad-
versary to generate adversarial examples for the adversar-
ial training of all defenders where k is the iteration steps, 
is the distortion bound and η is the step size. Specifically,
the configuration for the CIFAR10 dataset is k = 10,  =
8/255, η = 2/255 and that for the CIFAR100 dataset is
k = 10,  = 0.01, η = 0.001. For the CIFAR10 dataset with
ResNet architecture, we use the same setting in (Pang, Xu,
et al., 2019) which is k = 10,  ∼ U(0.01, 0.05), η = /10.
Baseline Methods. Because the model capacity has sig-
nificant impact on the inference performance, therefore, for
a fair comparison, we compare our method with the start-
of-the-art ensemble-based method, i.e., ADV-EN (Madry et
al., 2018) and ADP (Pang, Xu, et al., 2019), which have the
same number of committee members and also the member’s
architecture. More specifically, ADV-EN is the variant of
PGD adversarial training method (ADV) in the context of
ensemble learning, in which the entire ensemble model is
treated as one unified model applied with adversarial train-
ing. We also compare with the ADV method which is adver-
sarial training on a single model. For ADP, we choose the
best setting ADP2,0.5 with adversarial version, which was
reported in the paper (Pang, Xu, et al., 2019), and use the
official code.2
Throughout our experiments, we use two variants of our
method: (i) Robustness Mode (i.e., CCE-RM) for which we
set λpm = λdm = 1 and (ii) Detection Mode (i.e., CCE-
DM) for which we disable cPO (λpm = 0) and strengthen
DO (i.e., λdm = 5).
Attack Setting. We use different state-of-the-art attacks to
evaluate the defense methods including:
(i) Gradient based attacks (with cleverhans3 lib). We
use PGD (Madry et al., 2018), the Basic Iterative Method
(BIM) (Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, 2017) and
the Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) (Dong et al., 2018).
They share the same hyper-parameters configuration, i.e.,
{k, , η}, which is described in each individual experiment.
(ii) B&B attack (Brendel et al., 2019) (with foolbox4 lib)
which is a decision based attack. We argue that the B&B at-
tack setting in the paper of (Tramèr and Boneh, 2019) may
not be appropriate to evaluate the ADP method. It is because
the ADP method used PGD ( ∼ U(0.01, 0.05), k = 10)
for its adversarial training, while B&B attack used PGD
( = 0.15, k = 20) as an initialized attack which is much
stronger than the defense capacity. More specifically, the ini-
tialized PGD attack alone can reduce the accuracy to 0.1%.
Therefore, B&B attack contributes very little to the final at-
tack performance. To have a fair evaluation, we use two ini-
tialized attacks with lower strength: PGD1 ( = 8/255, η =
2/255, k = 20) and PGD2 ( = 16/255, η = 2/255, k =
20) then apply B&B attack with 100 steps and repeat for
three times. It is worth noting that, PGD2 is still much
stronger than the defense capacity, however, we use this set-
2https://github.com/P2333/Adaptive-Diversity-Promoting
3https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
4https://foolbox.readthedocs.io/en/stable/
Table 3: Robustness evaluation on the CIFAR10 dataset
with ResNet architecture. For the PGD attack, we use  =
8/255, η = 2/255. (*) The low robust accuracies (even with
standard method ADV) because the attack strength of PGD2
is double of the defense capacity, which makes the adversar-
ial examples to be recognizable.
Attack ADV1 ADV-EN2 ADP2 CCE-RM2 ADV-EN3 ADP3 CCE-RM3
Non-att (Nat. acc.) 83.9 85.3 85.3 84.5 86.1 86.2 84.9
PGD k = 250 41.4 42.8 44.2 45.8 43.8 45.1 48.6
BIM k = 250 41.5 42.9 44.1 45.8 44.0 45.2 48.8
MIM k = 250 41.9 43.3 44.8 46.3 44.5 45.7 49.1
B&B (wPGD1) 37.0 38.3 37.3 42.2 39.3 38.3 44.2
B&B (wPGD2)* 4.9 2.9 3.9 6.0 4.2 4.3 7.1
SPSA 50.0 53.5 52.8 56.2 53.8 53.9 56.6
Auto-Attack 16.1 18.5 17.3 18.8 18.4 17.6 20.8
ting to mimic the evaluation in the paper of (Tramèr and
Boneh, 2019).
(iii) Auto-Attack (Croce and Hein, 2020) (with the of-
ficial implementation5) which is an ensemble based attack.
We use  = 8/255 for the CIFAR10 dataset and  = 0.01
for the CIFAR100 dataset, both with standard version which
is an ensemble of four different attacks.
(iv) SPSA attack (Uesato et al., 2018) (with cleverhans
lib) which is a gradient-free optimization method. We use
 = 8/255 for the CIFAR10 dataset and  = 0.01 for the
CIFAR100 dataset, both with 50 steps.
The distortion metric we use in our experiments is l∞ for
all measures. We use the full test set for the attacks (i) and
1000 test samples for the attacks (ii-iv).
Robustness Evaluation
We conduct extensive experiments on the CIFAR10 and CI-
FAR100 datasets to compare our method with the other
methods. We consider the ensemble of both two and three
committee members (denoted by a subscript number in each
method). It can be observed from the experimental results in
Table [3, 4, 5] that:
(i) There is a gap of 2%∼3% when comparing ADV-EN3
with ADV1 showing that increasing model capacity (by in-
creasing number of ensemble member) can improve the ro-
bustness of the model.
(ii) There is a gap of 3%∼4% between ADP3 and ADV1,
and especially, a gap of 7%∼8% when comparing our
CCE-RM3 with ADV1, which shows the potential of the en-
semble learning to tackle with the adversarial attacks.
(iii) With the same model capacity, our CCE-RM is con-
sistently the best with all attacks and in some attacks, ours
surpasses other baselines in a large margin (4%∼5%).
(iv) There is a gap of 3% between CCE-RM3 and
CCE-RM2, which is larger than the gap of 1% between
ADP3 and ADP2 or that of ADV-EN3 and ADV-EN2, show-
ing that our method collaborates members better and gets
more benefit from ensembling more committee members.
The effectiveness of adversarial training method depends
on the diversity (or the hardness) of the adversarial examples
(Madry et al., 2018). Fort et al. (2019) found that differently
initializing members’ parameters, even with the same train-
5https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack
Table 4: Robustness evaluation on the CIFAR10 dataset with
standard CNN architecture. We use  = 8/255, η = 2/255.
Note that mulA represents for multiple-targeted attack by
adversary A.
Attack ADV1 ADV-EN2 ADP2 CCE-RM2 ADV-EN3 ADP3 CCE-RM3
Non-att (Nat. acc.) 75.7 76.0 75.9 76.0 76.7 76.6 75.7
PGD k = 100 38.0 39.7 42.2 44.7 40.8 43.9 46.8
BIM k = 100 38.2 39.7 42.2 44.9 40.8 43.8 46.8
MIM k = 100 38.5 40.5 42.4 45.4 41.3 44.2 47.2
mul-PGD k = 20 26.0 27.7 27.8 31.9 28.3 32.4 36.9
mul-BIM k = 20 25.9 27.2 27.2 31.6 27.7 29.8 34.1
mul-MIM k = 20 26.2 28.1 28.3 32.3 29.0 30.7 34.6
SPSA 40.6 44.3 41.5 45.2 45.1 46.1 47.5
Auto-Attack 25.1 25.0 24.4 29.9 25.5 28.1 31.9
Table 5: Robustness evaluation on the CIFAR100 dataset
with standard CNN architecture. We use  = 0.01, η =
0.001. Note that mulA represents for multiple-targeted at-
tack by adversary A.
Attack ADV1 ADV-EN2 ADP2 CCE-RM2 ADV-EN3 ADP3 CCE-RM3
Non-att (Nat. acc.) 40.8 41.4 48.0 53.4 40.8 52.6 54.4
PGD k = 100 26.8 29.7 30.9 35.3 32.8 36.2 39.5
BIM k = 100 26.9 29.1 31.0 35.2 32.8 36.2 39.4
MIM k = 100 27.0 29.0 30.8 35.3 32.9 36.1 39.6
mul-PGD k = 20 16.4 15.8 20.1 24.2 16.6 24.8 28.4
mul-BIM k = 20 15.9 15.5 19.4 23.7 16.3 24.5 28.1
mul-MIM k = 20 16.7 16.1 20.3 24.1 16.8 25.1 28.6
SPSA 25.6 25.5 24.1 31.8 26.0 32.5 35.0
Auto-Attack 15.3 15.1 14.8 21.9 15.8 23.0 25.9
ing data, can end up with different local optimal in the so-
lution space. Therefore, the potential of ensemble learning
(in the remark ii) can be explained by the fact that the adver-
sarial space of an ensemble model Binsecure (x,y, fen, ) is
more diverse than that of a single model Binsecure (x,y, f, ).
Our advantages over others (in the remark iii, iv) can be
explained by the fact that our proposed method encourages
the diversity of its committee members. Specifically it can
be elaborated on with the following three key points. Firstly,
while other ensemble-based defenses use the adversarial ex-
amples of the entire ensemble xena ∼ Binsecure (x,y, fen, ),
our method makes use of the broader joint adversarial space
xia ∼ Binsecure
(
x,y, f i, 
)
(Lemma 1 (i)). Secondly, each
member has different loss landscape (Fort, Hu, and Lak-
shminarayanan, 2019), in addition with the randomness of
an adversary (e.g., random starting points in PGD), each
member has its individual adversarial set (partly collapsed
as shown in the next experiment). Therefore, similar with
the bagging technique, by promoting each member with its
adversarial examples independently, we can increase the di-
versity of the joint adversarial space. Last but not least, in-
spired from traditional ensemble learning (Yong Liu and
Yao, 1999), by elegantly collaborating PO and DO, we en-
courage the negative correlation among ensemble members,
therefore, further improve the diversity of the joint adversar-
ial space.
Transferability among Ensemble Members
The transferability is a phenomenon when adversarial exam-
ples generated to attack a specific model also mislead other
models trained for the same task. In the ensemble learn-
ing context, adversarial examples which are transferred well
among members will likely fool the entire ensemble. There-
fore, reducing the transferability among members is a prin-
cipled approach to achieve better robustness as claimed in
the previous works (Pang, Xu, et al., 2019; Kariyappa and
Qureshi, 2019). In this sub-section, we provide a further un-
derstanding of the transferability to the overall robustness
and show the impact of the transferring flow.
We first summarize the experiments setting. The experi-
ments are conducted on the CIFAR10 dataset with an en-
semble of two members under PGD attack with k = 20,  =
8/255, η = 2/255. The results are reported in Table 6. CCE-
Base is our model which disables the crossing PO and DO
by setting λpm = λdm = 0. a(i,j) represents for the ro-
bust accuracy when adversarial examples {xia} attack model
f j . |S| shows the cardinality of a subset S, i.e., the per-
centage of the images that go into the subset S, which can
be one of {S11, S01, S10, S00}. From the definition of the
transferability as mentioned above, to measure the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples {xia}, we can compute
the accuracy difference of model f i and f j , j 6= i against
the same attack {xia}. The smaller gap implies that ad-
versarial examples {xia} are more transferable. The overall
transferability of an ensemble method can be evaluated by
the sum the accuracy differences over all its members, i.e.,
T = a(1,2) − a(1,1) + a(2,1) − a(2,2).
We would like to emphasize some following important
empirical observations (Table 6):
1) The impact of the transferring flow. It can be ob-
served that the cardinality |S11| in CCE-RM (39.9%) is
larger than that in CCE-Base (36.1%), while the cardinality
|S01| , |S10| , |S00| is smaller than those in CCE-Base which
serves as evidence that the adversarial examples are success-
fully transferred from subsets S10, S01, S00 to subset S11 as
we expect. This helps improve the overall robustness of the
ensemble model from 43.3% for CCE-Base to 45.5% for
CCE-RM.
2) The transferable space is just a subset of the ad-
versarial space. By definition, the subset S00 consists of
adversarial examples which fools both models f1, f2, there-
fore, S00 represents for the transferable space of the ensem-
ble model fen. In fact, the cardinality of |S00| is smaller than
the insecure region of the ensemble model fen (i.e., the total
classification error 100%−a(en,en)) in all methods showing
that the transferable space cannot represent for the insecure
region of the ensemble model fen, and the former is just the
subset of the latter.
3) Reducing transferability among ensemble members
is not enough to improve adversarial robustness. In fact,
the transferability metric T for CCE-RM is 33.7% which is
much smaller than those for ADP and ADV-EN (59.3% and
65.5%, respectively). The smaller value of T shows that the
adversarial examples {x1a}, {x2a} in our method are more
transferable than those in ADV-EN and ADP. However, the
fact that the overall robustness of our method is significantly
better evidently shows that transferability is not the only fac-
tor for improving the robustness. This is because the robust-
ness of each individual member under a direct attack (i.e.,
a(1,1) or a(2,2)) is much lower than our method. In addition,
the cardinality |S11| in our method is 39.9% which is much
Table 6: Evaluation on the transferability among ensemble
members on the CIFAR10 dataset. {T, nT, asingle} are the
metrics of interest.
Model a(en,en) a(1,1) a(2,2) |S11| |S01| |S10| |S00| T nT asingle
ADV-EN 40.7 31.1 33.2 24.0 17.0 13.0 46.0 65.5 13.3 16.7
ADP 42.9 31.0 33.1 25.7 13.1 11.7 49.5 59.3 7.6 17.2
CCE-RM 45.5 41.7 41.4 39.9 5.2 5.5 49.5 33.7 5.0 5.6
CCE-Base 43.3 40.3 40.5 36.1 6.5 7.2 50.3 36.1 6.4 7.2
bigger than those in ADV-EN (24.0%) and ADP (25.7%).
We provide two additional metrics which are (i) nT =
100%−a(en,en)−|S00| to measure the cardinality of adver-
sarial examples set which successful attack model fen but
non transferable among f1, f2 and (ii) asingle = a(en,en)−
|S11| to measure the cardinality of adversarial examples set
which are correctly predicted by only one model either f1
or f2 but still being correctly predicted by model fen. The
comparison on the metric nT in Table 6 shows that most
of successful adversarial examples in our method are pre-
dicted incorrectly by both members. While the comparison
on the metric asingle shows that most of unsuccessful ad-
versarial examples in our method are predicted correctly
by both members. The two comparisons demonstrate that
our method have better robustness than other methods be-
cause (i) the adversarial examples have to fool both ensem-
ble members for a successful attack and (ii) our ensemble
model can predict correctly by both members which ex-
plains the higher performance.
The remarks (2, 3) further imply that:
An ensemble model cannot be secure against white-box
attacks unless its members are robust against direct attacks
(even they are secure against transferred attacks).
This hypothesis provides more understanding of the cor-
relation between the transferability and the overall robust-
ness of an ensemble model.
Improving Natural Accuracy and Adversarial
Detectability
The parameter λpm(λdm) controls the level of the agree-
ment (disagreement) of models {f i}, i ∈ [1, N ] and model
f j , j 6= i on the same adversarial example xja. By dis-
abling the crossing PO (λpm = 0) and strengthening DO
(i.e., λdm = 5), our method encourages the disagreement
among members on the same data example, therefore, in-
creases the negative correlation among them. This setting of
CCE-DM leads to two important properties, which are em-
pirically proved by the experiments below.
Improving Natural Accuracy. We compare natural accu-
racies of two variants: CCE-RM and CCE-DM against the
baselines. Table 7 shows that CCE-DM significantly im-
proves natural accuracy of the ensemble model by a large
margin. In traditional ensemble learning, the key ingredient
to improve natural performance is making ensemble mem-
bers more diverse (Kuncheva and Whitaker, 2003). By dis-
abling the crossing PO and strengthening DO, CCE-DM
variant enforces the diversity more strictly, which explains
Figure 1: Prediction example in the detection mode.
Top/bottom images are benign/adversarial images. Next
columns are outputs from f1, f2, fen
Figure 2: Histogram of prediction entropy in the detection
mode
the improvement of the natural performance. This result
demonstrates the promising usage of adversarial examples
to improve the traditional ensemble learning.
Table 7: Comparison of the natural performance on the CI-
FAR10 dataset (the subscript number denotes the number
members).
Model ADV-EN ADP CCE-RM CCE-DM
CNN2 76.0 75.9 76.0 86.0
CNN3 76.7 76.6 75.7 87.2
ResNet2 85.3 85.3 84.5 91.0
ResNet3 86.1 86.2 84.9 91.6
Adversarial Detectability. CCE-DM can distinguish be-
tween benign and adversarial examples more easily. It is be-
cause the committee members produce a uniform prediction
for adversarial examples, while yielding a very high confi-
dent prediction for benign examples. For example, as shown
in Figure 1, the committee members are highly certain when
predicting benign examples, while they provide highly un-
certain predictions with high entropy for adversarial exam-
ples. The histogram for all images in the test set and their ad-
versarial examples in Figure 2 demonstrate the consistency
of this observation over the data distribution.
These results further inspire us to develop a simple yet ef-
fective method to detect adversarial examples based on the
entropy of the model prediction. Following the evaluation in
(Pang, Du, et al., 2018; Pang, Xu, et al., 2019), we try with
different thresholds to distinguish the benign and adversar-
ial examples and report the AUC score of each adversarial
attack. It is worth noting that, we do not intend to compete
Figure 3: ROC of CCE-RM under multiple types of attack
Figure 4: ROC of CCE-RM under multiple attack strengths
with other adversarial detectors but just to show the advan-
tage and flexibility of our CCE. The experiment is on the CI-
FAR10 dataset with an ensemble of two members. We con-
duct two evaluations to justify our understanding. First, we
study our detection method against three different attacks:
PGD, BIM and MIM with the same hyper-parameter setting
k = 20,  = 8/255, η = 1/255. The result in Figure 3
shows that our method can accurately and consistently de-
tect all three kind of attacks. Secondly, we study our detec-
tion method on different attack strengths. We use the PGD
attack k = 20, η = 1/255 and vary the distortion bound 
from 1/255 to 24/255. The result in Figure 4 shows that our
method can perform well on a wide range of attack strengths.
The adversary is obviously less distinguishable when de-
creasing its strength. However, our method still obtains a
very high AUC score (93.4/100) even under a very weak
attack ( = 1/255), in which adversarial images look nearly
identical to the original ones.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the use of ensemble-based learning
to improve adversarial robustness. In particular, we propose
a cross-collaborative strategy by means of enforcing the
transferring flow of adversarial examples, thereby implic-
itly increasing the diversity of adversarial space and improv-
ing the robustness of the ensemble. Moreover, our proposed
method can be performed in both detection and robustness
modes. We conduct extensive and comprehensive experi-
ments to show the improvement of our proposed method on
state-of-the-art baselines. We also provide the detailed un-
derstanding of the relationship between the transferability
and the overall robustness in the ensemble learning context.
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Proof
Lemma 2. Let us define fens (·) = 12f1 (·)+ 12f2 (·) for two
given models f1 and f2. If f1 and f2 predict an example x
accurately, we have the following:
i) Binsecure (x,y, fens, ) ⊂ Binsecure
(
x,y, f1, 
) ∪
Binsecure
(
x,y, f2, 
)
.
ii) Bsecure
(
x,y, f1, 
) ∩ Bsecure (x,y, f2, ) ⊂
Bsecure (x,y, fens, ) .
Proof. It is obvious that Lemma 2 (i) and (ii) are equiva-
lent. We hence need to prove only Lemma 2 (ii). Consider
a classification problem on a dataset D with M classes,
the true label of x is y ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} and let x′ ∈
Bsecure
(
x,y, f1, 
) ∩ Bsecure (x,y, f2, ). Since f1 and f2
predict x′ correctly with the label y, we then have:
f1y (x
′) ≥ f1j (x′) ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M},
f2y (x
′) ≥ f2j (x′) ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}.
This follows that
fensy (x
′) ≥ fensj (x′) ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M},
which means
x′ ∈ Bsecure (x,y, fens, ) .
Related works
In this section we introduce the most related works to our
approach including adversarial training and ensemble-based
methods.
Adversarial Training.
Adversarial training (ADV) can be traced back to (I. J.
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2015), in which a model
becomes more robust by incorporating its adversarial exam-
ples into training data. Given a model f , a benign exam-
ple pair (x,y) and an adversarial example xa, the objective
function of ADV as:
LAT (x,xa,y) = L(f(x),y) + L(f(xa), y)
Although many defense models were broken by (Atha-
lye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner, 2018) or gave a
false sense of robustness because of the obfuscated gradient,
the adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) was among the
few that were resilient against attacks. Many ADV’s vari-
ants have been developed including but not limited to: (1)
difference in the choice of adversarial examples, e.g., the
worst-case examples (I. J. Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy,
2015) or most divergent examples (Hongyang Zhang et al.,
2019), (2) difference in the searching of adversarial exam-
ples, e.g., non-iterative FGSM, Rand FGSM with random
initial point or PGD with multiple iterative gradient descent
steps (Madry et al., 2018; Shafahi et al., 2019), (3) differ-
ence in additional regularizations, e.g., adding constraints in
the latent space (Haichao Zhang and Wang, 2019; Bui et al.,
2020), (4) difference in model architecture, e.g., activation
function (Xie et al., 2020) or ensemble models (Pang, Xu,
et al., 2019).
Ensemble-based Defenses.
Recent works (Tramèr, Kurakin, et al., 2018; Kariyappa
and Qureshi, 2019) shows that ensemble adversarial trained
models can reduce the dimensionality of adversarial sub-
space (Tramèr, Papernot, et al., 2017). There are differ-
ent approaches, however, the key ingredient of their stories
is reducing the transferability of adversarial examples be-
tween members. In (Tramèr, Kurakin, et al., 2018), the au-
thors used the crafted perturbations from static pretrained
models as augmented data to decouple the generation pro-
cess of adversarial examples of target model. However, as
reported in (Tramèr, Kurakin, et al., 2018), this method
was designed for black-box attacks, thus still vulnerable to
white-box attacks. In (Kariyappa and Qureshi, 2019), ro-
bustness was achieved by aligning the gradient of commit-
tee members to be diametrically opposed, hence reducing
the shared adversarial spaces, or the transferability. How-
ever, attempting to achieve gradient alignment is unreliable
for high-dimensional datasets and it is difficult to extend for
ensemble with more than two committee members. More re-
cently, (Pang, Xu, et al., 2019) proposed to promote the di-
versity of non-maximal predictions of the committee mem-
bers (i.e., the diversity among softmax probabilities except
the highest ones) to reduce the adversarial transferability
among them. The adaptive diversity promoting (ADP) regu-
larizer as: ADPα,β(x,y) = α H(F) + β log(ED), where
H(F) is the Shannon entropy of the ensemble prediction
and log(ED) is the logarithm of the ensemble diversity. As
reported in their paper, ADP can cooperate with adversarial
training to increase the robustness. In this case, the objective
function of ADV as:
LADP (x,xa,y) = LAT (x,xa,y)
−ADPα,β(x,y)−ADPα,β(xa,y)
Model architecture and training setting
We use both standard CNN architecture and ResNet ar-
chitecture in our experiment. For ResNet architecture, we
use the same architecture and training setting as in (Pang,
Xu, et al., 2019). More specifically, we use ResNet-20 and
Adam optimizer, with initialized learning rate 0.001 and re-
duce it by a factor 0.1 at epoch 80, 120, and 160. Table 8
summarizes the standard CNN architecture for each ensem-
ble member in our experiments. The architectures for the
MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets are identical with those in
(N. Carlini and D. Wagner, 2017). We use Adam optimiza-
tion with learning rate 0.001 for all datasets. Conv(k) rep-
resents for the Convolutional layer with k output filters and
ReLU activation. Kernel size 3 and stride 1 for every convo-
lution layer. FC(k) represents for the Fully Connected layers
with k output filters without ReLU activation. Dropout rate
Table 8: Model architectures for experimental section
MNIST CIFAR10 CIFAR100
2 x Conv(32) 2 x Conv(64) 3 x Conv(64)
MaxPool MaxPool MaxPool
2 x Conv(64) 2 x Conv(128) 3 x Conv(128)
MaxPool MaxPool MaxPool
FC(200), ReLU FC(256), ReLU FC(256), ReLU
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(200), ReLU FC(256), ReLU 2 x (FC(256), ReLU)
FC(10) FC(10) FC(100)
Softmax Softmax Softmax
Table 9: Comparison on the training time on the CIFAR10
dataset using ResNet architecture
Model N=2 N=3
ADV (N=1) 109s 109s
ADV-EN 205s 319s
ADP 210s 328s
Ours 356s 546s
is 0.5. We train models in 180 epochs for both CIFAR10
and CIFAR100 datasets and in 100 epochs for the MNIST
dataset.
Comparison on the training time. Our method requires
to find the adversarial examples of each member and do
cross inference, therefore, it takes a longer training pro-
cess. We measured the training time (per epoch) on our ma-
chine with Nvidia RTX Titan GPU, using ResNet architec-
ture (N=2,3) with batch size 64 on the CIFAR10 dataset and
summarize as in Table 9.
White-box attacks evaluation
In addition to the result in the experimental section, we pro-
vide further results on the evaluation of adversarial robust-
ness under white-box attacks. Firstly, we explain in detail
the metrics of interest in our experiments. Secondly, we pro-
vide an ablation study to show the impact of the transferring
flow to the improvement.
Robustness evaluation metrics
Static attack and Adaptive attack. There are two sce-
narios of attacks on an ensemble model (W. He et al., 2017).
The first scenario is static attack, in which the attacker is not
aware of the ensemble method (i.e., how to do the ensemble
for making the final prediction). The other scenario is adap-
tive attack, where the attacker has full access to the ensemble
method and adapts attacks accordingly. In our experiments,
we make use of the adaptive attack, which is a considerably
stronger attack.
Non-targeted attack and Multiple-targeted attack. We
use both non-targeted attack (A) and multiple-targeted at-
tack (mulA) in our evaluation. The non-targeted attack ob-
tains adversarial examples by maximizing the loss w.r.t its
true label, resulting in any non-true label prediction. The
Table 10: Ablation study on the impact of the transferring
flow. Note that mulA represents for the multiple-targeted
attack by adversary A.
(a) Evaluation on CIFAR10 dataset. We commonly use  =
8/255, η = 2/255
ADP2 CCE-Base2 CCE-RM2 ADP3 CCE-Base3 CCE-RM3
Non-att (Nat. acc.) 75.9 75.8 76.0 76.6 76.4 75.7
PGD k = 100 42.2 43.4 44.7 43.9 44.5 46.8
BIM k = 100 42.2 43.4 44.9 43.8 44.5 46.8
MIM k = 100 42.4 44.1 45.4 44.2 45.0 47.2
mul-PGD k = 20 27.8 31.1 31.9 32.4 32.4 36.9
mul-BIM k = 20 27.2 30.8 31.6 29.8 32.2 34.1
mul-MIM k = 20 28.3 31.5 32.3 30.7 32.9 34.6
SPSA 41.5 44.3 45.2 46.1 47.2 47.5
Auto-Attack 24.4 29.2 29.9 28.1 31.5 31.9
(b) Evaluation on CIFAR100 dataset. We commonly use
 = 0.01, η = 0.001
ADP2 CCE-Base2 CCE-RM2 ADP3 CCE-Base3 CCE-RM3
Non-att (Nat. acc.) 48.0 51.1 53.4 52.6 54.2 54.4
PGD k = 100 30.9 33.6 35.3 36.2 37.0 39.5
BIM k = 100 31.0 33.7 35.2 36.2 37.1 39.4
MIM k = 100 30.8 33.5 35.3 36.1 37.2 39.6
mul-PGD k = 20 20.1 23.0 24.2 24.8 26.2 28.4
mul-BIM k = 20 19.4 22.6 23.7 24.5 25.9 28.1
mul-MIM k = 20 20.3 23.1 24.1 25.1 26.4 28.6
SPSA 24.1 32.1 31.8 32.5 35.1 35.0
Auto-Attack 14.8 22.0 21.9 23.0 26.1 25.9
multiple-targeted attack is undertaken by performing simul-
taneously targeted attacks for all possible data labels (10
for CIFAR10 and 100 for CIFAR100) and being counted if
any individual targeted-attack is successful. While the non-
targeted attack considers only one direction of the gradient,
the multiple-targeted attack takes many directions into ac-
count, therefore, being considered as a much stronger attack.
Ablation study
We provide an ablation study to compare CCE-RM with
CCE-Base (which disables promoting and demoting oper-
ations by setting λpm = λdm = 0). Firstly, the compari-
son in Table 10 shows that even CCE-Base variant can beat
ADP method on both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets.
This surpassness can be explained from the fact our pro-
posed method encourages the diversity of its committee
members. More specifically, each member is reinforced with
two data sources: clean data {x} and adversarial examples
{xna}, which becomes more diverge due to the gradually
more divergence of the committee models and the random
initialization of PGD at the step 0. From this point of view,
our method can be linked to the bagging technique in tra-
ditional ensemble learning, which is a well-known method
to produce the diversity in the ensemble. Secondly, CCE-
RM shows a huge improvement over CCE-Base in both CI-
FAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. This result demonstrates the
impact of the transferring flow, which offers better collabo-
ration among members.
In addition, we study the impact of each PO and DO to
the final performance by evaluating them separately. Table
11 shows the comparison when disabling one of these oper-
ations while varying the other. It can be observed that: (i) the
ensemble tends to be detection mode (i.e., increasing natural
performance and adversarial detectability while sacrificing
its robustness) when increasing DO’s strength (λdm ≥ 2),
Table 11: Ablation study on the impact of each operation
PO/DO. We commonly use  = 8/255, η = 2/255. Note
that mulA represents for the multiple-targeted attack by ad-
versary A.
(a) Using DO only by disabling cPO (λpm = 0)
λdm = 0 λdm = 1 λdm = 2 λdm = 5
Non-att (Nat. acc.) 75.8 76.6 83.2 86.0
PGD k = 100 43.4 43.3 23.9 26.1
BIM k = 100 43.4 43.2 24.0 26.2
MIM k = 100 44.1 43.6 31.1 21.7
mul-PGD k = 20 31.1 29.9 14.9 20.1
mul-BIM k = 20 30.8 29.8 13.1 19.8
mul-MIM k = 20 31.5 30.3 28.6 21.7
SPSA 44.3 44.4 30.4 5.3
Auto-Attack 29.2 29.8 1.6 0.2
(b) Using PO only by disabling DO (λdm = 0)
λpm = 0 λpm = 1 λpm = 2 λpm = 5
Non-att (Nat. acc.) 75.8 76.4 76.2 77.1
PGD k = 100 43.4 42.7 42.7 41.3
BIM k = 100 43.4 42.8 42.7 41.5
MIM k = 100 44.1 43.0 43.2 41.9
mul-PGD k = 20 31.1 30.4 30.0 29.7
mul-BIM k = 20 30.8 30.3 29.9 29.6
mul-MIM k = 20 31.5 30.8 30.4 30.1
SPSA 44.3 44.3 45.5 46.2
Auto-Attack 29.2 29.7 28.8 30.0
(ii) the ensemble tends to reduce its robustness slightly when
increasing PO’s strength, (iii) neither PO nor DO can im-
prove the robustness alone, which shows the important of
the transferring flow. These observations are inline with the
properties of PO and DO which have been mentioned in the
main paper. The parameter λpm(λdm) controls the level of
the agreement (disagreement) of models {f i}, i ∈ [1, N ]
and model f j , j 6= i on the same adversarial example xja.
Therefore the observation (i) can be explained by the fact
that by disabling cPO (λpm = 0) and strengthening DO,
our method encourages the disagreement among members
on the same data example, therefore, increases the negative
correlation among them. In contrast, by disabling DO and
increasing cPO’s strength, our method increases the agree-
ment among members, therefore, increases the positive cor-
relation. The increasing of the positive correlation among
members reduces the diversity of adversarial space, there-
fore, explains the observation (ii).
Black-box attacks evaluation
We investigate the transferability of adversarial examples
among models and evaluate the robustness under black-box
attacks. The experiment is conducted on the CIFAR10 and
CIFAR100 datasets, with ensemble of two members. We
use PGD to challenge each ensemble model to generate ad-
versarial examples then transfer these adversarial examples
to attack other models. The PGD configuration for the CI-
FAR10 dataset is k = 20, η = 2/255,  ∈ {8/255, 12/255},
while that for the CIFAR100 dataset is k = 20, η =
0.001,  ∈ {0.01, 0.02}. The result is shown in Figure ??.
Table 12: Blackbox attack evaluation on CIFAR10 dataset
(a) PGD attack with k = 20,  = 8/255, η = 2/255
NAT ADV-EN ADP CCE-RM
NAT 9.2 76.2 75.6 74.5
ADV-EN 59.5 40.7 58.5 58.4
ADP 58.4 61.8 42.9 59.9
CCE-RM 57.3 58.9 57.4 45.5
(b) PGD attack with k = 20,  = 12/255, η = 2/255
NAT ADV-EN ADP CCE-RM
NAT 8.0 75.5 75.1 74.0
ADV-EN 40.1 23.6 44.5 45.2
ADP 38.4 48.5 24.9 47.1
CCE-RM 35.9 42.9 41.3 27.8
Table 13: Blackbox attack evaluation on CIFAR100 dataset
(a) PGD attack with k = 20,  = 0.01, η = 0.001
NAT ADV-EN ADP CCE-RM
NAT 14.7 43.6 49.3 52.9
ADV-EN 42.9 31.1 48.1 51.6
ADP 41.8 41.6 32.8 50.9
CCE-RM 39.4 40.2 45.8 36.1
(b) PGD attack with k = 20,  = 0.02, η = 0.001
NAT ADV-EN ADP CCE-RM
NAT 13.0 43.6 49.2 52.9
ADV-EN 39.9 24.3 46.9 50.4
ADP 38.3 40.6 25.2 49.4
CCE-RM 34.5 38.2 43.0 27.5
The element a(i,j) in each sub-table represents the robust
accuracy when adversarial examples from model i attack
model j. NAT represents for the natural model which does
not engage with any defense method. It is worth noting that,
the diagonal in each sub-table represents robust accuracies
against the white-box attacks, which has been discussed in
the section above.
Firstly, the first row in each sub-table shows the robust
accuracy against adversarial examples which are transferred
from the natural model (NAT). This result shows that our
method outperforms baseline methods on the CIFAR100
dataset, but to be weaker than other on the CIFAR10 dataset.
Secondly, each column in each sub-table compares the at-
tack strength of different models on the same defense model.
The comparison on these columns shows that adversarial ex-
amples which are crafted from our CCE-RM attack better
than those crafted from other methods (i.e., by giving lower
robust accuracy). This result indicates that our method gen-
erates stronger adversarial examples than other methods.
Loss surface visualization
In addition to the quantitative evaluation on the adversarial
robustness, we would like to provide two additional visu-
alizations which further demonstrate our improvement. The
visualizations are conducted on the same image from CI-
FAR10 dataset with the ensemble of two models. First, we
visualize the prediction probability of each ensemble mem-
ber and the entire ensemble with the same two types of in-
put which are a benign example and adversarial example of
the benign one. The visualization as Figure 5 shows that our
method can produce a high confident prediction unlike ADP
which has a less confident prediction because of its diversity
promoting method. Secondly, we visualize the loss surface
around the adversarial example xa w.r.t three different of
model:f1, f2 and fen. We generate a grid of neighborhood
images {xa + i ∗ u + j ∗ v} where u = ∇xC (f(xa),y) is
the gradient of the prediction loss w.r.t the input and v is the
random perpendicular vector to u. In each sub-figure, the
left image is the adversarial example of interest while the
middle and the right image depict the loss surface and the
predicted labels corresponding with the neighbor grid. Our
method can produce correct labels in entire the neighbor-
hood region, unlike other methods that still have an incor-
rect prediction region. Therefore, our method can produce a
smoother surface around the adversarial example which fur-
ther explains the better robustness in our method.
(a) ADV-EN.
(b) ADP.
(c) CCE-RM.
Figure 5: Prediction example. Top/bottom images are be-
nign/adversarial images. Next columns are outputs from
f1, f2, fen.
(a) Prediction surface of model f1.
(b) Prediction surface of model f2.
(c) Prediction surface of model fen.
Figure 6: Loss surface around adversarial example of ADV-
EN method. Left: Adversarial input. Middle: Loss surface.
Right: Predicted labels.
(a) Prediction surface of model f1.
(b) Prediction surface of model f2.
(c) Prediction surface of model fen.
Figure 7: Loss surface around adversarial example of ADP
method. Left: Adversarial input. Middle: Loss surface.
Right: Predicted labels.
(a) Prediction surface of model f1.
(b) Prediction surface of model f2.
(c) Prediction surface of model fen.
Figure 8: Loss surface around adversarial example of CCE-
RM method. Left: Adversarial input. Middle: Loss surface.
Right: Predicted labels.
